represented as an independent and autonomous source of absolute value, which value he holds even against life. But already from the beginning of the novel, when confronted first with a pimping gachupin, whom he kills, and then with an old friend now a general in the army of the institutionalized revolution, whom he mocks, Juan Rubio begins to suspect that the passing of the revolution will mean more than political defeat. He realizes that with the death of Pancho Villa, the grand dream of social and individual dignity will be subverted.
From this subversion will emerge a new class of men, like Rene Soto, a political intriguer, whom Juan sees as worthless: "He was nothing," Rubio says to one of them, "and you are nothing."6 This is Juan's vision of the world: one is either something, dignified and real, or one is nothing. In this formulation, Villarreal seems less concerned with portraying "abstract stereotypes drawn from the popular Mexican collective unconscious" as Tino Villanueva suggests,7 than with representing the thematics of the patriarchal will to power. What is to be willed here is the power of absolute value over and against any other formulation concerning human action. From the perspective of narrative stratagem, not only is Villarreal's ploy of skirting with stereotypes dramatically effective, it is also essential for the intended analysis of value which is now to follow. Life, as action, manifests itself in Juan's view in a continuing resistance to that which would negate it. For Juan there can be no middle ground, no reconciliation between the poles of being and nothing, which have become ethical as well as ontological terms. The result of this irreconcilability is, as various readers have pointed out, a narrative about "the menace of chaotic discontinuity." 8 The young Richard early reasons that since, as the Church teaches, there is only good and evil in the world, and that since the differences between good and evil are inherently ambiguous, then it is possible that these differences cannot be known. "He was frightened," the narrator tells us, "because he could not know [the differences]" and because "somehow God was in the middle of the whole thing. To do 'bad' things had something to do with being alive, but really what were bad things?" (Pocho p. 37). This naive conflation of "life" and "bad things" is later expressed in more exact terms: "I was scared," says Richard, "because if He willed it so, I knew that the earth would open and it would swallow me up because I dared to demand explanations from Him.... Then, one day, I knew that ... if He could do the best thing in the world, He could also do the most evil thing in the world" (Pocho p. 65). If after this recognition the two concepts of good and evil are still to be differentiated, then the difference must be based on a perception of something other than a pure meaning or idea to serve as the substance of good or evil. Richard's question of the nature of good and evil is posed, therefore, not to eliminate their opposition, but to show that the terms appear as the difference9 of the other: in Richard's view, "good" constitutes itself by its very relation to what it absolutely is not. Good is not evil; but it is evil that has not yet happened, and vice versa. The significance of Richard's elementary intuition into the differential structure of moral codes is that it removes value, and therefore meaning, from the realm of a static, transcendent sphere and places it instead within the active domain of history and culture.
By the same token, this recognition of the differential structure of moral codes leads to Richard's later rejection of all "codes of honor," in so far as they are founded upon falsely absolute standards. He does so because he sees that moral codes, as cultural artifacts, are contingent upon time, and therefore not to be arrested into static presences by human knowledge. This inability to know absolutely characterizes the development of Richard's character and culminates in his portentous response to his mother's insistence that he be something when he grows up: "I do not want to be something; I am" (Pocho p. 64).
The melodrama of adolescence aside, Richard's affirmation of being indicates that for him the world is not a source of value as it is for his father. Richard wishes rather to appropriate the world to himself, and to subjugate it by shaping it with his understanding, in the commanding mode of divine self-reference, "I am." The real world is thus not to be seen as a determinant of action, but more accurately, as the scene of action. Socioeconomic conditions of rural California in the 1930s preclude, however, that Richard's action can be anything more than a spiritual rebellion against the various imposed forms of cultural reality. Yet, by resisting the imposition of cultural norms, Richard wishes subversively to devalue reality: "Everything does not have to be real," he claims (Pocho p. 65).
If everything is not real, then what is it? Richard Rubio, at the source of contemporary Chicano narrative, is not afraid of the un-real, the nothing, which his father rejects. But at this point, as his mother realizes when she says to him, "I have really lost you, my son!" (Pocho p. 66), Richard is indeed no longer with us. It may be instructive to find out where he is.
The novel Pocho has always been somewhat of an embarrassment to Chicanos. Even the preface to the Anchor paperback edition seems to show the need to apologize for the novel. Richard's rejection of his father's values, his statements that "codes of honor are stupid" (Pocho p. 108), his rejection of the Catholic faith, and, of course, his departure at the novel's end to join the United States armed forces in the months just prior to Pearl Harbor are seen as assimilationist tendencies. But given the fact that Richard has always been a tolerant person among social, religious, sexual, and moral intolerants, and given the fact that he sees the coming war as an event spawned by wrong and bound only to create further wrongs (Pocho p. 185), Richard's decision to enlist can be seen either as a supreme contradiction, or as a positive step in a dialectic of developing understanding.
As an indication that we may pursue this second option, it should be noted that at the conclusion of the novel, Richard is in fact closer in spirit to his father than he has been at any other time in their relationship. He realizes that within that other world of value, "Father had won his battle" because he "had never 
II. The Dialectics of Difference
At the outset of such a history, we have Villarreal's novel. Tomas Rivera's magisterial work, y no se lo trag6 la tierra (1971), however, takes the formal and thematic issues raised by Villarreal's novel to their limits.
The twelve sections of Rivera's novel, preceded and concluded by a frame story, relate the seasonal events in a year of the life of an unnamed migrant child. As is the case in the major Chicano novels after Pocho, Rivera faithfully situates his story in the day to day life of present social reality. The poverty, hardships, and exploitation which his characters experience is no more than that which he himself might have experienced. But apart from the reality of economic exploitation, Rivera's novel also represents the anguish of a transcendently spiritual exploitation: his anonymous narrator, born of absence and of loss, seeks to recover "un ano perdido." 16 Without a name, initially without a sense of specific geographical space or real time, unable to decide whether he wakes or dreams, the child calls out and turns, not realizing he himself has spoken: "oia que alguien le llamaba por su nombre pero cuando volteaba la cabeza a ver quien era el que le llamaba, daba una vuelta entera y asi quedaba donde mismo" ( Through a series of wire-tight chapters, which amount to no more than an interior monologue repeating snatches of half-heard conversations, Rivera portrays la raza's indomitable will to survive. With the two core episodes of the novel, "La noche estaba plateada" ("It Was a Silvery Night") and the title piece, "y no se lo trago la tierra "("And the Earth Did Not Part"), Rivera now chronicles the rise of an even more intractable will to power. But it must occur by degrees. First, one silvery night, the child walks into a wood to summon the devil because: "Lo del diablo le habia fascinado desde cuando no se acordaba" ( The protagonist's reticence before the annihilation of traditional value schemes in "La noche estaba plateada," is overcome in the climactic conclusion to the following section, "y no se lo trago la tierra." There, haunted by his inability to understand why a beneficent God would allow disaster to strike unremittingly a good and innocent people, the protagonist finally brings himself to curse God. This ultimate rejection of an ideology of acceptance and submission allows him to elevate his own creative will into a higher sphere of existence and thus to produce his own history. Here too, as in Pocho, the act of rejection isolates a systematic distrust of any pre-existent, transcendental rule of value because such systems contribute to the enslavement of the individual will. It is only in the context of present historical conditions and under the influence of its own productive intellect that the individual can create a personal and cultural identity. With "y no se lo tragb la tierra," the Chicano novel moves from a possible to an actual state of being.
Rivera's story places us in the full misery of a South Texas field, parched by the noonday sun, as a small group of Chicanos weed a crop. The previous day, the young boy's father, working under these same conditions, has suffered a sunstroke. Trapped as much by his mother's passive faith as by the exploitative economic system, he screams, "ZQue se gana, mama, con andar ... In contrast to this density, the simplicity of Fausto's death becomes an act of revolutionary art: it allows the ground of life, which is death, to become visible and manageable. And it makes the gap between subjective experience and the empirical world collapse in a moment of pure insight. Fausto's creation of "Tamazunchale" as the symbolic place of life-in-death forces upon us the view that reality is a changing, discontinuous process, produced by men and so transformable by them. It demonstrates how character and action can be different and need not be conceived of as historically fixed. Writing about how the storyteller "borrows his authority from death," Walter Benjamin notes that "The novel is significant ... not because it presents someone else's fate to us, perhaps didactically, but because this stranger's fate by virtue of the flame which consumes it yields us the warmth which we never draw from our own fate. What draws the reader to the novel is the hope of warming his shivering life with a death he reads about."22 Seen as the storyteller who can let the wick of his life be consumed by the flame of his story, Fausto thus joins the ranks of philosophers and poets who produce their own valid reality. In effect, Fausto transforms his death into the triumphant life of art, which is the difference between life and death.
III. History as Dialectics
The subversive edge of each of the novels we have examined effects destruction. But this destruction always implies the reconstruction of what has been undone at the site of its former presence.23 This reconstruction is not simply the ordering of the chaos of reality. The Chicano novel's ideology of difference emerges from a more complex unity of at least two formal elements: its paradoxical impulse toward revolutionary deconstruction and toward the production of meaning. A unified theory of the Chicano novel must be able to handle this duality. The general notion of "difference" I have proposed allows us to consider this dual tendency of the Chicano novel faithfully, for it uses a dialectical concept that determines the semantic "space of Chicano literature" as that intersection of the cultural-historical reality appropriated by the text to produce itself, and of the esthetic reality produced by the text.24 Opting for conflict rather than resolution, for difference over similarity, the Chicano novel is thus not so much the expression of this ideology of difference as it is a production of that ideology.
To be true to the principles of the text and the world which conditions it, criticism must, as a consequence, take the text's deconstructive pattern as its analytical model. We must remember, moreover, that a true dialectic necessarily involves us in negation. In a relationship between opposed terms, one annuls the other and lifts it up into a higher sphere of existence: development through opposition and conflict-neither Mexican, nor American, nor yet a naive Mexican-American, but something else. This something else is the differance of contemporary Chicano literature, which allows it to retain its special relation to both its Mexican and American contexts, while also letting it be marked by its relation to its own still unconditioned future. It should be clear that in pointing out this differential structure of the Chicano novel, I have not intended to reduce the significant differences among Chicano novels. The rich and varied profundity of these texts would frustrate any critic's attempt to squeeze them into any kind of reductive schema. What I have intended is to provide a theoretical context within which a practical literary history and criticism of the Chicano novel's difference might be elaborated. 
